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Abstract
Malware detection is a popular application of Machine
Learning for Information Security (ML-Sec), in which an
ML classifier is trained to predict whether a given file is mal-
ware or benignware. Parameters of this classifier are typi-
cally optimized such that outputs from the model over a set
of input samples most closely match the samples true ma-
licious/benign (1/0) target labels. However, there are often
a number of other sources of contextual metadata for each
malware sample, beyond an aggregate malicious/benign la-
bel, including multiple labeling sources and malware type in-
formation (e.g., ransomware, trojan, etc.), which we can feed
to the classifier as auxiliary prediction targets. In this work,
we fit deep neural networks to multiple additional targets de-
rived from metadata in a threat intelligence feed for Portable
Executable (PE) malware and benignware, including a multi-
source malicious/benign loss, a count loss on multi-source
detections, and a semantic malware attribute tag loss. We
find that incorporating multiple auxiliary loss terms yields a
marked improvement in performance on the main detection
task. We also demonstrate that these gains likely stem from
a more informed neural network representation and are not
due to a regularization artifact of multi-target learning. Our
auxiliary loss architecture yields a significant reduction in
detection error rate (false negatives) of 42.6% at a false pos-
itive rate (FPR) of 10−3 when compared to a similar model
with only one target, and a decrease of 53.8% at 10−5 FPR.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) for computer security (ML-Sec) has
proven to be a powerful tool for malware detection. ML
models are now integral parts of commercial anti-malware
engines and multiple vendors in the industry have dedicated
ML-Sec teams. For the malware detection problem, these
models are typically tuned to predict a binary label (mali-
∗ Equal contribution.
Contact: <firstname>.<lastname>@sophos.com
cious or benign) using features extracted from sample files.
Unlike signature engines, where the aim is to reactively
blacklist/whitelist malicious/benign samples that hard-match
manually-defined patterns (signatures), ML engines employ
numerical optimization on parameters of highly parametric
models that aim to learn more general concepts of malware
and benignware. This allows some degree of proactive de-
tection of previously unseen malware samples that is not typ-
ically provided by signature-only engines.
Frequently, malware classification is framed as a binary
classification task using a simple binary cross-entropy or
two-class softmax loss function. However, there often ex-
ist substantial metadata available at training time that contain
more information about each input sample than just an aggre-
gate label of whether it is malicious or benign. Such meta-
data might include malicious/benign labels from multiple
sources (e.g., from various security vendors), malware fam-
ily information, file attributes, temporal information, geo-
graphical location information, counts of affected endpoints,
and associated tags. In many cases this metadata will not be
available when the model is deployed, and so in general it
is difficult to include this data as features in the model (al-
though see Vapnik et al. [27, 28] for one approach to doing
so with Support Vector Machines).
It is a popular practice in the domain of malware analysis
to derive binary malicious/benign labels based on a heuristic
combination of multiple detection sources for a given file,
and then use these noisy labels for training ML models [8].
However, there is nothing that precludes training a classi-
fier to predict each of these source labels simultaneously op-
timization classifier parameters over these predictions + la-
bels. In fact, one might argue intuitively that guiding a model
to develop representations capable of predicting multiple tar-
gets simultaneously may have a smoothing or regularizing
effect conducive to generalization, particularly if the auxil-
iary targets are related to the main target of interest. These
auxiliary targets can be ignored during test time if they are
ancillary to the task at hand (and in many cases the extra
weights required to produce them can be removed from the
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model prior to deployment), but nevertheless, there is much
reason to believe that forcing the model to fit multiple targets
simultaneously can improve performance on the key output
of interest. In this work, we take advantage of multi-target
learning [2] by exploring the use of metadata from threat in-
telligence feeds as auxiliary targets for model training.
Research in other domains of applied machine learning
supports this intuition [13, 18, 11, 29, 1, 21], however out-
side of the work of Huang et al. [10], multi-target learning
has not been widely applied in anti-malware literature. In
this paper, we present a wide-ranging study applying aux-
iliary loss functions to anti-malware classifiers. In contrast
to [10], which studies the addition of a single auxiliary la-
bel for a fundamentally different task, i.e., malware family
classification – we study both the addition of multiple la-
bel sources for the same task and multiple label sources for
multiple separate tasks. Also, in contrast to [10], we do not
presume the presence of all labels from all sources, and in-
troduce a per-sample weighting scheme on each loss term to
accommodate missing labels in the metadata. We further ex-
plore the use of multi-objective training as a way to expand
the number of trainable samples in cases where the aggregate
malicious/benign label is unclear, and where those samples
would otherwise be excluded from purely binary training.
Having established for which loss types and in which con-
texts auxiliary loss optimization works well, we then explore
why it works well, via experiments designed to test whether
performance gains are a result of a regularization effect from
multi-objective training or information from the content of
the target labels that the network has learned to correlate.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• A demonstration that including auxiliary losses yields
improved performance on the main task. When all of
our auxiliary loss terms are included, we see a reduc-
tion of 53.8% in detection error (false negative) rate at
10−5 false positive rate (FPR) and a 42.6% reduction in
detection error rate at 10−3 FPR compared to our base-
line model. We also see a consistently better and lower-
variance ROC curve across all false positive rates.
• A breakdown of performance improvements from dif-
ferent auxiliary loss types. We find that an auxiliary
Poisson loss on detection counts tends to yield im-
proved detection rates at higher FPR areas (≥ 10−3) of
the ROC curve, while multiple binary auxiliary losses
tend to yield improved detection performance in lower
FPR areas of the ROC curve (< 10−3). When combined
we see a net improvement across the entire ROC curve
over using any single auxiliary loss type.
• An investigation into the mechanism by which multi-
objective optimization yields enhanced performance,
including experiments to assess possible regularization
effects.
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows: First,
in Section 2 we discuss some of the metadata available for
use as auxiliary targets, and feature extraction methods for
portable executable (PE) files. We then provide details on
how we converted the available metadata into auxiliary tar-
gets and losses, as well as how the individual losses are
weighted and combined on a per-sample basis in Section 3.
We finish that Section with a description of how our dataset
was collected and provide summary statistics. In Section 4
we describe our experimental evaluations across a number of
combinations of auxiliary targets, and demonstrate the im-
pact of fitting these targets on the performance of the main
malware detection task. Section 5 presents discussion of our
results, as well as another set of experiments on synthetic
targets to explore potential explanations for the observed im-
provement. Section 6 presents related work and Section 7
concludes.
2 ML-Sec Detection Pipelines: From Single
Objective to Multi-Objective
In the following, we describe a simplified ML-Sec pipeline
for training a malicious file classifier, and propose a simple
extension that allows the use of metadata available during
training (but not at test time) and improves performance on
the classification task.
ML-Sec detection pipelines use powerful machine learn-
ing models that require many labeled malicious and be-
nign samples to train. Data is typically gathered from sev-
eral sources, including deployed anti-malware products and
vendor aggregation services, which run uploaded samples
through vendor products and provide reports containing per-
vendor detections and metadata. The exact nature of the
metadata varies, but typically, malicious and benign scores
are provided for each of M individual samples on a per-
vendor basis, such that, given V vendors, between 0 and V of
them will designate a sample malicious. For a given sample,
some vendors may choose not to answer, resulting in a miss-
ing label for that vendor. Furthermore, many vendors also
provide a detection name (or malware family name) when
they issue a detection for a given file. Additional information
may also be available, but crucially, the following metadata
are presumed present for the models presented in this paper:
i) per-vendor labels for each sample, either malicious/benign
(mapped to binary 1/0, respectively) or NULL; ii) textual
per-vendor labels on the sample describing the family and
variant of the malware (an empty string if benign); and iii)
time at which the sample was first seen.
Using the individual vendor detections, an aggregate label
can be derived either by a voting mechanism or by threshold-
ing the net number of vendors that identify a given sample as
malicious. The use of aggregated anti-malware vendor de-
tections as a noisy labeling source presumes that the vendor
diagnoses are generally accurate. While this is not necessar-
ily a valid assumption, e.g., for novel malware and benign-
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ware, this is typically accounted for by using samples and
metadata that are slightly dated so that vendors can correct
their respective mistakes (e.g., by blacklisting samples in a
signature database).
Each malware/benignware sample must also be converted
to a numerical vector to be able to train a classifier, a process
called feature extraction. In this work we focus on static
malware detection, meaning that we assume only access to
the binary file, as opposed to dynamic detection, in which
the features used predominantly come from the execution of
the file. The feature extraction mechanism varies depending
on the format type at hand, but consists of some numerical
transformation that preserves aggregate and fine-grained in-
formation throughout each sample, for example, the feature
extraction proposed by Saxe et al. [24] – which we use in
this work – uses windowed byte statistics, 2D histograms of
delimited string hash vs. length, and histograms of hashes of
PE-format specific metadata – e.g., imports from the import
address table (IAT).
Given extracted features and derived labels, a classifier
is then trained. Parameters are tuned to minimize mis-
classification as measured by some loss criterion, which un-
der the constraints of some statistical noise model measures
the deviation in predictions from their ground truth. For both
neural networks and ensemble methods a logistic sigmoid is
commonly used to constrain predictions to a [0,1] range, and
a cross-entropy loss between predictions and labels is used
as the minimization criterion under a Bernoulli noise model
per-label.
While the prior description roughly characterizes ML-Sec
pipelines discussed in literature to date, note that much infor-
mation in the metadata, which is often not used to determine
the sample label but is correlated to the aggregate classifica-
tion, is not used in training, e.g., the individual vendor classi-
fications, the combined number of detections across all ven-
dors, and information related to malware type that could be
derived from the detection names. In this work, we augment
a deep neural network malicious/benign classifier with addi-
tional output predictions of vendor counts, individual vendor
labels, and/or attribute tags. These separate prediction arms
were given their own loss functions which we jointly min-
imized through backpropagation. The difference between a
conventional malware detection pipeline and our model can
be visualized by considering Figure 1 in the absence and
presence of auxiliary outputs (and their associated losses)
connected by the dashed lines. In the next section, we shall
explore the precise formulation and implementation of these
different loss functions.
3 Implementation Details
In this section we describe our implementation of the exper-
iments sketched above. We first introduce our model im-
mediately below, followed by the various loss functions –
denoted by Lloss type (X ,Y ) for some input features X and tar-
Figure 1: A schematic overview of our neural network archi-
tecture. Multiple output layers with corresponding loss func-
tions are optionally connected to a common base topology
which consists of five dense blocks. Each block is composed
of a Dropout, dense and batch normalization layers followed
by an exponential linear unit (ELU) activation of sizes 1024,
768, 512, 512, and 512. This base, connected to our main
malicious/benign output (solid line in the figure) with a loss
on the aggregate label constitutes our baseline architecture.
Auxiliary outputs and their respective losses are represented
in dashed lines. The auxiliary losses fall into three types:
count loss, multi-label vendor loss, and multi-label attribute
tag loss. The formulation of each of these auxiliary loss types
is explained in Section 3.
gets Y – associated with the various outputs of the model, as
well as how the labels Y representing the targets of these out-
puts are constructed. Finally we introduce how our data set
of M samples associated with V vendor targets is collected.
We use the same feature representation as well as the same
general model class and topology for all experiments. Each
portable executable file is converted into a feature vector as
described in [24].
The base for our model (shown in Figure 1) is a feed-
forward neural network incorporating multiple blocks com-
posed of Dropout [26], a dense layer, batch normalization
[12], and an exponential linear unit (ELU) activation [6].
The core of the model contains five such blocks with 1024,
768, 512, 512, and 512 hidden units, respectively. This base
topology applies the function f (·) to the input vector to pro-
duce an intermediate 512 dimensional representation of the
input file h = f (x). We then append to this model an ad-
ditional block, consisting of one or more dense layers and
activation functions, for each output of the model. We de-
note the composition of our base topology and our target-
specific final dense layers and activations applied to features
x by ftarget(x). The output for the main malware/benign pre-
diction task – fmal(x) – is always present and consists of a
single dense layer followed by a sigmoid activation on top of
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the base shared network that aims to estimate the probability
of the input sample being malicious. A network architecture
with only this malware/benign output serves as the baseline
for our evaluations. To this baseline model we add auxiliary
outputs with similar structure as described above: one fully
connected layer (two for the tag prediction task in Section
3.4) which produces some task-specific number of outputs
(a single output, with the exception of the restricted general-
ized Poisson distribution output, which uses two) and some
task-specific activation described in the associated sections
below.
Except where noted otherwise, all multi-task losses were
produced by computing the sum, across all tasks, of the per-
task loss multiplied by a task-specific weight (1.0 for the
malware/benign task and 0.1 for all other tasks; see Section
4). Training was standardized at 10 epochs; for all experi-
ments we used a training set of 9 million samples and a test
set of approximately 7 million samples. Additional details
about the training and test data are reported in Section 3.6.
Additionally, we used a validation set of 100,000 samples to
ensure that each network had converged to an approximate
minimum on validation loss after 10 epochs. All of our mod-
els were implemented in Keras [5] and optimized using the
Adam optimizer [14] with Keras’s default parameters.
3.1 Malware Loss
As explained in Section 2, for the task of predicting if a given
binary file, represented by its features x(i) is malicious or be-
nign we used a binary cross-entropy loss between the mal-
ware/benign output of the network yˆ(i) = fmal(x(i)) and the
malicious label y(i). This results in the following loss for a
dataset with M samples:
Lmal(X ,Y ) =
1
M
M
∑
i=1
`mal( fmal(x(i)),y(i))
=− 1
M
M
∑
i=1
y(i) log(yˆ(i))+(1− y(i)) log(1− yˆ(i)).
(1)
In this paper, we use a “1-/5+” criterion for labeling a
given file as malicious or benign: if a file has one or fewer
vendors reporting it as malicious, we label the file as ‘be-
nign’ and use a weight of 1.0 for the malware loss for that
sample. Similarly, if a sample has five or more vendors re-
porting it as malicious, we label the file as ‘malicious’ and
use a weight of 1.0 for the malware loss for that sample.
3.2 Vendor Count Loss
To more finely distinguish between positive results, we in-
vestigate the use of the total number of ‘malicious’ reports
for a given sample from the vendor aggregation service as
an additional target; the rationale being that a sample with a
higher number of malicious vendor reports should, all things
being equal, be more likely to be malicious. In order to prop-
erly model this target, we require a suitable noise model for
count data. A popular candidate is a Poisson noise model,
parameterized by a single parameter µ , which assumes that
counts follow a Poisson process, where µ is the mean and
variance of the Poisson distribution. The probability of an
observation of y counts conditional on µ is
P(y|µ) = µye−µ/y!. (2)
In our problem, as we expect the mean number of posi-
tive results for a given sample to be related to the file it-
self, we attempt to learn to estimate µ conditional on each
sample x(i) in such a way that the likelihood of y(i)|µ(i) is
maximized (or, equivalently, the negative log-likelihood is
minimized). Denote the output of the neural network with
which we are attempting to estimate the mean count of ven-
dor positives for sample i as fcnt(x(i)). Note that under a
non-distributional loss, this would be denoted by yˆ(i), how-
ever since we are fitting a parameter of a distribution, and
not the sample label y directly, we use different notation in
this section. By taking some appropriate activation function
a(·) that maps fcnt(x(i)) to the non-negative real numbers, we
can write µ(i) = a
(
fcnt(x(i))
)
. Consistent with generalized
linear model (GLM) literature [17], we use an exponential
activation for a, though one could equally well employ some
other transformation with the correct range, for instance the
ReLU function.
Letting y(i) here denote the actual number of vendors that
recognized sample x(i) as malicious, the corresponding neg-
ative log-likelihood loss over the dataset is
Lp(X ,Y ) =
1
M
M
∑
i=1
`p
(
a
(
fcnt(x(i))
)
,y(i)
)
=
1
M
M
∑
i=1
µ(i)− y(i) log(µ(i))+ log(y(i)!), (3)
which we will refer to as the Poisson or vendor count loss.
In practice, we ignore the log(y(i)!) term when minimizing
this loss since it does not depend on the parameters of the
network.
A Poisson loss is more intuitive for dealing with count
data than other common loss functions, even for count data
not generated by a Poisson process. This is partly due to the
discrete nature of the distribution and partly because the as-
sumption of increased variance with predicted mean is more
accurate than a homoscedastic – i.e., constant variance –
noise model.
While the assumption of increasing variance with pre-
dicted count value seems reasonable, it is very unlikely that
vendor counts perfectly follow a Poisson process – where
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the mean is the variance – due to correlations between ven-
dors, which might occur from modeling choice and licens-
ing/OEM between vendor products. The variance might in-
crease at a higher or lower rate than the count and might not
even be directly proportional to or increase monotonically
with the count. Therefore, we also implemented a Restricted
Generalized Poisson distribution [9] – a slightly more intri-
cate noise model that accommodates dispersion in the vari-
ance of vendor counts. Given dispersion parameter α , the
Restricted Generalized Poisson distribution has a probability
mass function (pmf):
P(y|α,µ)=
(
µ
1+αµ
)y
(1+αy)y−1 exp
(−µ(1+αy)
1+αµ
)
/y!.
(4)
When α = 0, this reduces to Eq. 2. α > 0 accounts for
over-dispersion, while α < 0 accounts for under-dispersion.
Note that in our use case, α , like µ is estimated by the neu-
ral network and conditioned on the feature vector, allowing
varying dispersion per-sample. Given the density function in
Eq. 4, the resultant log-likelihood loss for a dataset with M
samples is defined as:
Lgp(X ,Y ) =− 1M
M
∑
i=1
[
y(i)
(
logµ(i)− log(1+α(i)µ(i)))
+(y(i)−1) log(1+α(i)y(i))
− µ
(i)(1+α(i)y(i))
1+α(i)µ(i)
++ log(y(i)!)
]
,
(5)
where α(i) and µ(i) are obtained as transformed outputs of
the neural network in a similar fashion as we obtain µ(i) for
the Poisson loss. In practice, as for the Poisson loss, we
dropped the term related to y! since it does not affect the
optimization of the network parameters.
Note also that restrictions must be placed on the negative
value of the α(i) term to keep the arguments of the logarithm
positive. For numerical convenience, we used an exponential
activation over the dense layer for our α(i) estimator, which
accommodates over-dispersion but not under-dispersion. Re-
sults from experiments comparing the use of Poisson and
Generalized Poisson auxiliary losses are presented in Sec-
tion 4.1.
3.3 Per-Vendor Malware Loss
The aggregation service from which we collected data for
our experiments contains a breakout of individual vendor re-
sults per sample. We identified a subset V = {v1, . . . ,vV}
of 9 vendors that each produced a result for (nearly) every
sample in our data. Each vendor result was added as a tar-
get in addition to the malware target by adding an extra fully
connected layer per vendor followed by a sigmoid activation
function to the end of the shared architecture. Standard bi-
nary cross-entropy loss per vendor is used for training. Note
that this differs from the vendor count loss presented above
in that each high-coverage vendor is used as an individual
binary target, rather than being aggregated into a count.
The aggregate vendors loss Lvdr for the V = 9 selected
vendors is simply the sum of the individual vendor losses:
Lvdr(X ,Y ) =
1
M
M
∑
i=1
V
∑
j=1
`vdr
(
fvdr j
(
x(i)
)
,y(i)v j
)
=− 1
M
M
∑
i=1
V
∑
j=1
y(i)v j log(yˆ
(i)
v j )+(1− y(i)v j ) log(1− yˆ(i)v j ),
(6)
where `vdr is the per-sample binary cross-entropy function
and fvdr j
(
x(i)
)
= yˆ(i)v j the output of the network that is trained
to predict the label y(i)v j assigned by vendor j to input sample
x(i).
Results from experiments exploring the use of individual
vendor targets in addition to malware label targets are pre-
sented in Section 4.2.
3.4 Malicious Tags Loss
In this experiment we attempt exploit information contained
in family detection names provided by different vendors in
the form of malicious tags. We define a malicious tag as
a high level description of the purpose of a given mali-
cious sample. The tags used as auxiliary targets in our ex-
periments are: flooder, downloader, dropper, ransomware,
crypto-miner, worm, adware, spyware, packed, file-infector,
and installer.
The process of creating these tags consists in parsing the
individual vendor detection names to first extract relevant to-
kens within these detection names. We use a set of 10 ven-
dors that we know, by experience, provide high quality de-
tection names. Once we extracted the most common tokens
from the detection names via simple parsing, we manually
filtered them to keep only those tokens related to well-known
malware family names or tokens that could be easily associ-
ated with one or more of our tags. For example, the token
xmrig – even though it is not a malware family – can be rec-
ognized as referring to a crypto-currency mining software
and therefore can be associated with the crytpo-miner tag.
We then create a mapping from tokens to tags based on prior
knowledge. We label a sample as associated with tag ti if
any of the tokens associated with ti are present in any of the
detection names assigned to the sample by the set of trusted
vendors.
Annotating our dataset with these tags, allows us to de-
fine the tag prediction task as multi-label binary classifica-
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tion,since zero or more tags from the set of possible tags
T = {t1, . . . , tT} can be present at the same time for a given
sample. We introduce this prediction task in order to have
targets in our loss function that are not not directly related
to the number of vendors that recognize the sample as ma-
licious. The vendor counts and the individual vendor labels
are closely related with the definition of our main target, i.e.
the malicious label, which classifies a sample as malicious if
5 or more vendors identify the sample as malware (see Sec-
tion 3.1). In the case of the tag targets, this information is
not present. For instance, if all the vendors recognize a given
sample as coming from the WannaCry family in their detec-
tion names, the sample will be associated only once with the
ransomware tag. On the converse, because of our tagging
mechanism, if only one vendor considers that a given sam-
ple is malicious and classifies it as coming from the Wan-
naCry family, the ransomware tag will be present (although
our malicious label will be 0).
In order to predict these tags, we use a multi-headed ar-
chitecture in which we add two additional layers per tag to
the end of the shared base architecture followed by a sigmoid
activation function, as shown in Figure 1. Each tag t j out of
the possible T = 11 tags has its own loss term computed with
binary cross-entropy. Like the per-vendor malware loss, the
aggregate tag loss is the sum of the individual tag losses. For
the dataset with M samples it becomes:
Ltag(X ,Y ) =
1
M
M
∑
i=1
T
∑
j=1
`tag
(
ftag j
(
x(i)
)
,y(i)t j
)
=− 1
M
M
∑
i=1
T
∑
j=1
y(i)t j log(yˆ
(i)
t j )+(1− y
(i)
t j ) log(1− yˆ
(i)
t j ),
(7)
where y(i)t j indicates if sample i is annotated with tag j, and
yˆ(i)t j = ftag j
(
x(i)
)
is the prediction issued by the network for
that value.
3.5 Sample Weights
While our multi-objective network has the advantage that
multiple labels and loss functions serve as additional sources
of information, this introduces an additional complexity:
given many (potentially missing) labels for each sample, we
cannot rely on having all labels for a large quantity of the
samples. Moreover, this problem gets worse as more la-
bels are added. To address this, we incorporated per-sample
weights, depending on the presence and absence of each la-
bel. For labels that are missing, we assign them to a default
value and then set the associated weights to zero in the loss
computation so a sample with a missing target label will not
add to the loss computation for that target. Though this in-
troduces slight implementation overhead, it allows us to train
our network, even in the presence of partially labeled sam-
ples (e.g., when a vendor decides not to answer).
3.6 Dataset
We collected two datasets of PE files and associated meta-
data from a threat intelligence feed: a set for train-
ing/validation and a test set. For the training/validation
set, we pulled 20M PE files and associated metadata, ran-
domly sub-selecting over a year – from September 6, 2017
to September 6, 2018. For the test set, we pulled files from
October 6, 2018 to December 6, 2018. Note also that we
indexed files based on unique SHA for first seen time, so ev-
ery PE in the test set comes temporally after the ones in the
training set. We do not use a randomized cross-validation
training/test split as is common in other fields, because that
would allow the set on which the classifier was trained to
contain files “from the future”, leading to spuriously opti-
mistic results. The reason for the one month gap between the
end of the training/validation set and the start of the test set is
to simulate a realistic worst-case deployment scenario where
the detection model of interest is updated on a monthly basis.
We then extracted 1024-element feature vectors for all
those files using feature type described in [24] and derived
an aggregate malicious/benign label using a 1-/5+ criterion
as described above. Invalid PE files were discarded.
Of the valid PE files from which we were able to extract
features we then further subsampled our training dataset to
8,775,185 training samples, with 7,188,150, or 81.9% ma-
licious and 1,587,035 or 18.1% benign. Our validation set
was also randomly subsampled from the same period as the
training data and used to monitor convergence during train-
ing. It consisted of 97,439 samples; of these, 17,620 were
benign (18.1%) and 79,819 were malicious (81.9%).Our test
set exhibited similar statistics, with a size of 7,368,851 to-
tal samples, 1,606,787 benign (21.8%), and 5,762,064 mali-
cious (78.2%).
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we apply the auxiliary losses presented in in
Section 3, first individually, each loss in conjunction with
a main malicious/benign loss, and then simultaneously in
one combined model. We then compare to a baseline model,
finding that each loss term yields an improvement, either in
or in Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) net area un-
der the curve (AUC) or in terms of detection performance at
low false positive rates (FPR). We note that none of the aux-
iliary losses presented in this section, when added, reduced
AUC or low-FPR ROC performance on the aggregate ma-
licious/benign label from the baseline model. Each model
used a loss weight of 1.0 on the aggregate malicious/benign
loss and 0.1 on each auxiliary loss, i.e. when we add K tar-
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gets to the main loss, the final loss that gets backpropagated
through the model becomes
L(X ,Y ) = Lmal(X ,Y )+0.1
K
∑
k=1
Lk(X ,Y ). (8)
Results are depicted in graphical form in Figure 2 and in
tabular form in Table 1, with uncertainty evaluated by ini-
tializing each model’s weights randomly and training for 10
epochs over five runs. Notice that the ROC curves in Figure
2 are plotted on a logarithmic scale for visibility, since the
baseline performance is already quite high and significant
marginal improvements are difficult to discern. For this rea-
son, we also include relative reductions in mean true positive
detection error and in standard deviation from the baseline
for our best model in Table 1, and for all models in Table
A.1 in the appendix.
4.1 Vendor Count Loss
We employed the same base PE model topology as for our
other experiments, with a primary malicious/benign binary
cross entropy loss, and an auxiliary count loss. We experi-
mented with two different loss functions for the count loss
– a Poisson loss and a Restricted Generalized Poisson loss
(equations 3 and 5 respectively). For the Poisson loss, we
used an exponential activation over a dense layer atop the
base to estimate µ(i). For the Restricted Generalized Poisson
loss, we followed a similar pattern using two separate dense
layers with exponential activations on top; one for the µ(i)
parameter and another for the α(i) parameter. The choice of
an exponential activation is consistent with statistics litera-
ture on Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) [17].
Results on the malware detection task, using Poisson and
Restricted Generalized Poisson (RG-Poisson) losses as an
auxiliary loss function are shown in Figure 2a. When com-
pared to a baseline using no auxiliary loss, we see a statisti-
cally significant improvement with the Poisson loss function
in both AUC and ROC curve, particularly in low false pos-
itive rate (FPR) regions. The RG-Poisson loss, by contrast
yields no statistically significant gains over the baseline in
terms of AUC, nor does it appear to yield statistically signif-
icant gains at any point along the ROC curve.
This suggests that the RG-Poisson loss model is ill-fit,
which could stem from a variety of issues. First, if counts
are under-dispersed, an over-dispersed Poisson loss could be
an inappropriate model. Under-dispersion could occur if cer-
tain vendors disproportionately trigger simultaneously or be-
cause counts are inherently bounded by the net number of
vendors. Second, a Poisson model, even with added disper-
sion parameters, is an ill-posed model of count data, but re-
moving the dispersion parameter removes a dimension in the
parameter space to over-fit on. Inspecting the dispersion pa-
rameters predicted by the RG-Poisson model, we noted that
they were relatively large, which supports this hypothesis.
We also noticed that the RG-Poisson model converged sig-
nificantly faster than the Poisson model in terms of malware
detection loss.
4.2 Modeling Individual Vendor Responses
Incorporating the multi-label binary cross-entropy loss
across vendors as an auxiliary loss, described in section 3.3,
in conjunction with the main malicious/benign loss yields a
similar increase in the TPR at low FPR regions of the ROC
curve (see Figure 2b) as the Poisson experiment. While this
does not lead to a significant increase in AUC due to the fact
that the improvement is integrated across an extremely nar-
row range of FPRs, this improvement in TPR at lower FPRs
may still be operationally significant, and does indicate an
improvement in the model.
4.3 Incorporating Tags as Targets
In this experiment we extend the architecture of our base net-
work to predict, not only the malware/benign label, but also
the set of 11 tags defined in section 3.4. For this, we add two
fully connected layers (FC[512-256] and FC[256-1]) per tag
to the end of the base architecture that will be trained to iden-
tify that tag from the shared representation. Each of these
tag-specialized layers predicts a binary output for the pres-
ence or absence of the tag given the shared representation
and uses a binary cross-entropy loss that gets added to the
losses of the rest of the tags and the malicious/benign loss,
i.e. the loss for this experiment is a sum containing one term
per tag, weighted by a loss weight of 0.1 as mentioned at the
beginning of this section, and one term for the loss incurred
on the main task.
The result of this experiment represented via the ROC
curves of Figure 2c. Similar to section 4.2 we see no statisti-
cal difference in the AUC values with respect to the baseline,
but we do observe substantial statistical improvement in the
predictions of the model in low FPR regions, particularly for
FPR values lower than 10−3. Furthermore, we also witness
a substantial decrease in the variance of the ROC curve.
4.4 Combined Model
Finally, we extend our model to predict all auxiliary targets
in conjunction with the aggregate label, with a net loss term
containing a combination of all auxiliary losses used in pre-
vious experiments. The final loss function for the experi-
ment is the sum of all the individual losses where the mal-
ware/benign loss has a weight of 1.0 while the rest of the
losses have a weight of 0.1.
The resulting ROC curve and AUC are shown in Figure
2d. The AUC of 0.9972± 0.0001 is the highest obtained
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(a) Count Loss (b) Vendor Loss
(c) Tag Loss (d) Combined Loss
Figure 2: ROC curves and AUC statistics for count, vendor, and tag losses compared to our baseline. Lines represent the mean
TPR at a given FPR, while shaded regions represent ±1 standard deviation. Statistics were aggregated over 5 training runs,
each with random parameter initialization. (a) Count loss. Our baseline model (blue solid line) is shown compared to a model
employing a Poisson auxiliary loss (red dashed line), and a dispersed Poisson auxiliary loss (green dotted line). (b) Auxiliary
loss on multiple vendors malicious/benign labels (red dashed line) and baseline (blue solid line). (c) Auxiliary loss on semantic
attribute tags (red dashed line) and baseline (blue solid line). (d) Our combined model (red dashed line) and baseline (blue solid
line). The combined model utilizes an aggregate malicious/benign loss with an auxiliary Poisson count loss, a multi-vendor
malicious/benign loss, and a malware attribute tag loss.
across all the experiments conducted in this study. More-
over, in contrast to utilizing any single auxiliary loss, we see
a noticeable improvement in the ROC curve not only in very
low FPR regions, but also at 10−3 FPR. Additionally, vari-
ance is consistently lower across a range of low-FPR values
for this combined model than for our baseline or any previ-
ous models. An exception is near 10−6 FPR where measur-
ing variance is an ill-posed problem because even with a test
dataset of over 7M samples, detecting or misdetecting even
one or two of them can significantly affect detection rate.
5 Discussion
In this section, we examine the effects of different types of
auxiliary loss functions on main task ROC curve. We then
perform a sanity check to establish whether our performance
increases result from additional information added to our
neural networks by the auxiliary loss functions or are the ar-
tifact of some regularization effect.
5.1 Modes of Improvement
Examining the plots in Figure 2, we see three different types
of improvement that result from our auxiliary losses:
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FPR
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
TPR Baseline 0.427 ± 0.076 0.692 ± 0.049 0.864 ± 0.031 0.965 ± 0.007 0.9928 ± 0.0007
TPR Poisson 0.645 ± 0.029 0.785 ± 0.034 0.903 ± 0.016 0.970 ± 0.001 0.9932 ± 0.0002
TPR RG Poisson 0.427 ± 0.116 0.711 ± 0.041 0.870 ± 0.016 0.966 ± 0.003 0.9930 ± 0.0003
TPR Vendors 0.697 ± 0.034 0.792 ± 0.024 0.889 ± 0.020 0.970 ± 0.004 0.9928 ± 0.0014
TPR Tags 0.677 ± 0.027 0.792 ± 0.009 0.875 ± 0.022 0.971 ± 0.004 0.9932 ± 0.0008
TPR All Targets 0.735 ± 0.014 0.806 ± 0.017 0.922 ± 0.004 0.972 ± 0.003 0.9934 ± 0.0004
% Error Reduction (All Targets) 53.8% 37.0% 42.7% 20.0% 8.3%
% Variance Reduction (All Targets) 81.6% 65.3% 87.1% 57.1% 94.3%
Table 1: Top: Mean and standard deviation true positive rates (TPRs) for the different experiments in Section 4 at false positive
rates (FPRs) of interest. Results were aggregated over five training runs with different weight initializations and minibatch
orderings. Best results consistently occurred when using all auxiliary losses and are shown in bold. Bottom: Percentage
reduction in missed true positive detections and percentage reductions in ROC curve standard deviation resulting from the best
model (All Targets) compared to the baseline across various FPRs. State-of-the-art results are shown in bold.
1. A bump in TPR at low FPR (< 10−3).
2. A net increase in AUC and a small bump in performance
at higher FPRs (≥ 10−3).
3. A reduction in variance.
Improvement 1 is particularly pronounced in the plots due
to the logarithmic scale, but it does not substantially con-
tribute to net AUC due to the narrow FPR range. How-
ever, this low-FPR part of the ROC is important from an
operational perspective when deploying a malware detection
model in practice. Substantially higher TPRs at low FPR
could allow for novel use cases in an operational scenario.
Notice that this effect is more pronounced for auxiliary
losses containing multi-objective binary labels (Figs. 2b, 2c,
and 2d) than for the Poisson loss, suggesting that it occurs
most prominently when employing our multi-objective bi-
nary label losses. Let us consider why a multi-objective bi-
nary loss might cause such an effect to occur: At low FPRs,
we see high thresholds on the detection score from the main
output of the network. To surpass this threshold and reg-
ister as a detection, the main sigmoid output must be very
close to 1.0, i.e., very high response. Under a latent corre-
lation with the main output, a high-response hit for an aux-
iliary target label could also boost the response for the main
detector output, while a baseline model without this infor-
mation might mis-detect. We hypothesize that this improve-
ment 1 occurs from having many objectives simultaneously
and thereby increasing chances for a high-response target hit.
The loss type may or may not be incidental, which is consis-
tent with its noticeable but less pronounced presence under a
single-objective Poisson auxiliary loss (Figure 2a).
Improvement 2 likely stems from improvements in detec-
tion rate that we see around 10−3 FPR and higher. Notice
that these effects are more pronounced in Figs. 2a and 2d, are
somewhat noticeable in Figure 2b, and are not noticeable in
Figure 2c, consistent with the resultant AUCs. This suggests
that the effect occurs most prominently in the presence of an
auxiliary count loss. We postulate that this occurs because
our aggregate detection label is derived by thresholding the
net number of vendor detections for each sample but in do-
ing so removes a notional view of confidence that a sample
is malicious, or alternatively difficulty of classifying a mali-
cious sample or extent of “maliciousness” that the number of
detection counts provides. Bear in mind that some detectors
are better at detecting different types of malware than others,
so more detections suggest a more malicious file, e.g., with
more malware components, or more widely blacklisted file
(higher confidence). Providing information on the number
of counts in an auxiliary loss function may therefore provide
the classifier more principled information on how to order
detection scores, thus allowing for more effective threshold-
ing and a better ROC curve.
Improvement 3 occurs across all loss types, particularly
in low FPR ranges, with the exception of very low FPRs
(e.g., 10−6), where accurately measuring mean and variance
is an ill-posed problem due to the size of the dataset (cf. sec-
tion 4.4). Comparing the ROC plots in Figure 2, the reduc-
tion in variance appears more pronounced as the number of
losses increases. Intuitively, this is not a surprising result
since adding objectives/tasks imposes constrains the allow-
able weight space – while many choices of weights might
allow a network to perform a single task well only a subset
of these choices will work well for all tasks simultaneously.
Thus, assuming equivalent base topology, we expect a net-
work that is able to perform at least as well on multiple tasks
as many single-task networks to exhibit lower variance.
Combining all losses seems to accentuates all improve-
ments (1-3) with predictable modes which we attribute to
our various loss types (Figure 2d) – higher detection rate at
low FPR brought about primarily by multi-objective binary
losses, a net AUC increase and a detection bump at 10−3
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Figure 3: When we remove the attribute tags loss (green dot-
ted line) we get a similar shaped ROC curve with similar
ROC compared to using all losses (red dashed line), but with
slightly higher variance in the ROC. This supports our hy-
potheses about effects of different loss functions on the shape
of the ROC curve. The baseline is shown as a blue solid line
for comparison.
FPR brought about by the count loss, and a reduced vari-
ance brought about by many loss functions. To convince
ourselves that this is not a coincidence, we also trained a
network using only Poisson and vendor auxiliary losses but
no attribute tags (cf Figure 3). As expected, we see that this
curve exhibits similar general shape and AUC characteristics
that occur when training with all loss terms, but the variance
appears slightly increased.
In the variance-reduction sense, we can view our auxiliary
losses as regularizers. This raises an important question: are
improvements 1 and 2 actually occurring for the reasons that
we hypothesize or are they merely naive result of regulariza-
tion?
5.2 Representation or Regularization?
While the introduction of some kinds of auxiliary targets ap-
pears to improve the performance of the model on the main
task, it is less clear why this is the case. The reduction in
variance produced by the addition of extra targets suggests
one potential alternative explanation for the observed im-
provement: rather than inducing a more discriminative rep-
resentation in the hidden layers of the network, the additional
targets may be acting as constraints on the network, reduc-
ing the space of viable weights for the final trained network,
and thus acting as a form of additional regularization. Alter-
natively, the addition of extra targets may simply be accel-
erating training by amplifying the gradient; while this seems
unlikely given our use of a validation set to monitor approxi-
mate convergence, we nevertheless also investigate this pos-
sibility.
To evaluate these hypotheses, we constructed three addi-
tional targets (and associated loss functions) that provided
uninformative targets to the model: i) a pseudo-random tar-
get that is approximately independent of either the input fea-
tures or the malware/benign label; ii) an additional copy of
the main malware target transformed to act as a regression
target; and iii) an additional copy of the main malware tar-
get.
The random target approach attempts to directly evaluate
whether or not an additional pseudo-random target might im-
prove network performance by ‘using up’ excess capacity
that might otherwise lead to overfitting. We generate pseudo-
random labels for each sample based off of the parity of a
hash of the file contents. While this value is effectively ran-
dom and independent of the actual malware/benignware la-
bel of the file, the use of a hash value ensures that a given
sample will always produce the same pseudo-random tar-
get. This target is fit via standard binary cross-entropy loss
against a sigmoid output,
Lrnd(X ,Y ) =− 1M
M
∑
i=1
y(i) log frnd(x(i))+
(1− y(i)) log
(
1− frnd(x(i))
)
, (9)
where frnd
(
x(i)
)
is the output of the network which is being
fit to the random target y(i).
In contrast, the duplicated regression target evaluates
whether further constraining the weights without requiring
excess capacity to model additional independent targets has
an effect on the performance on the main task. The model
is forced to adopt an internal representation that can satisfy
two different loss functions for perfectly correlated targets,
thus inducing a constraint that does not add additional infor-
mation. To do this, we convert our binary labels (taking on
values of 0 and 1 for benign and malware, respectively) to
-10 and 10, and add them as additional regression targets fit
via mean squared error (MSE). Taking y(i) as the ith binary
target and fMSE(x(i)) as the regression output of the network,
we can express the MSE loss as:
Lmse(X ,Y ) =
M
∑
i=1
(
fmse
(
x(i)
)
−20
(
y(i)−0.5
))2
. (10)
Finally, in the case of the duplicated target, the model ef-
fectively receives a larger gradient due to our duplication of
the loss. The loss for the duplicated label uses the identical
cross-entropy loss as for the main target, obtained by substi-
tuting fdup(x(i)) for fmal(x(i)) in equation 1 as the additional
model output that is being fit to the duplicated target. Note
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that we performed two variants on the duplicated target ex-
periment: one in which both the dense layer prior to the main
malware target and the dense layer prior to the duplicated tar-
get were trainable, and one in which the dense layer for the
duplicate target was frozen at its initialization values to avoid
the trivial solution in which the pre-activation layer for both
the main and duplicate target were identical. In both cases,
the results were equivalent; only results for the trainable case
are shown.
Both frnd and fdup are obtained by applying a dense layer
followed by a sigmoid activation function to the intermediate
output of the input sample from the shared base layer (h in
Figure 1), while fmse(x(i)) is obtained by passing the inter-
mediate representation of the input sample h through a fully
connected layer with no output non-linearity.
Figure 4: ROC curves comparing classification capabilities
of models on the malware target when either random (green
dotted line), regression (red dashed line), or duplicated tar-
gets (magenta dashed and dotted line) are added as auxiliary
losses. Note that with the exception of the regression loss
– which appears to harm performance – there is little dis-
cernible difference between the remaining ROC curves. The
baseline is shown as a blue solid line for comparison.
Results of all three experiments are shown in Figure 4. In
no case did the performance of the model on the main task
improve statistically significantly over the baseline. This
suggests that auxiliary tasks must encode relevant informa-
tion to improve the model’s performance on the main task.
For each of the three auxiliary loss types in Figure 4, there is
no additional information provided by the auxiliary targets:
the random target is completely uncorrelated from any in-
formation in the file (and indeed the final layer is ultimately
dominated by the bias weights and produces a constant out-
put of 0.5 regardless of the inputs to the layer), while the
duplicated and MSE layers are perfectly correlated with the
final target. In either case, there is no incentive for the net-
work to develop a richer representation in layers closer to
the input; the final layer alone is sufficient given an adequate
representation in the core of the model.
6 Related Work
The application of machine learning to computer security
dates back to the 1990’s [20], but large-scale commercial
deployments of deep neural networks (DNNs) that have
led to transformative performance increases are a more re-
cent phenomenon. Several works from the ML-Sec com-
munity have leveraged DNNs for statically detecting mali-
cious content across a variety of different formats and file
types [24, 25, 22]. However, these works predominantly
focus on applying regularized cross entropy loss functions
between single network outputs and malicious/benign labels
per-sample, leaving the potential of multiple-objective op-
timization largely untapped. A notable exception is [10],
where Huang et al. added a multiclass label for Microsoft’s
malware families, and used a categorical cross entropy loss
function atop a softmax output as an auxiliary objective.
Note that this is a heterogeneous classification task, not mul-
tiple sources of the same label, unlike our vendor label loss,
and unlike our malware attribute tag loss, their labels are mu-
tually exclusive. They also do not address the problem of
missing labels.
Despite the lack of attention from the ML-Sec community,
multi-objective/multi-task optimization has been applied to
other areas of machine learning for a long time, even if not
explicitly referred to as such. The work of Abu-Mostafa [2]
predates most explicit references to multi-task learning by
introducing the concept of hints, in which known invariances
of a solution (such as traslation invariance, or invariance un-
der negation) can be incorporated into network structure and
used to generate additional training samples by applying the
invariant operation to the existing samples, or – most relevant
to our work – used as an additional target by enforcing that
samples modified by an invariant function should not only be
both correctly classified, but also explicitly classified identi-
cally. Caruna [4] first introduced multi-task learning in neu-
ral networks as a “source of inductive bias” (also reframed as
inductive transfer in [3]), in which more difficult tasks could
be combined in order to exploit similarities between tasks
that could serve as complementary signals during training.
While his work predates the general availability of modern
GPUs, and thus the models and tasks he examines are fairly
simple, Caruna nevertheless demonstrates that jointly learn-
ing related tasks produce better generalization on a task-by-
task basis than learning them individually. It is interesting to
note that in [4] he also demonstrated that learning multiple
copies of the same task can also lead to a modest improve-
ment in performance (which we did not observe in this work,
possibly due to the larger scale and complexity of our task).
Kumar and Duame [16] consider a refinement on the basic
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multi-task learning approach that leads to clustering related
tasks, in an effort to mitigate the potential of negative trans-
fer in which adding an unrelated task to the set of tasks be-
ing trained into a given model can degrade performance on
the target task. Similarly, the work of Rudd et al. [21] ex-
plores the use of domain-adaptive weighting of tasks during
the training process.
Multi-objective optimization has been applied to ex-
tremely complex image classification tasks, including pre-
dicting characters and ngrams within unconstrained images
of text [13], joint facial landmark localization and detection
[18], image tagging and retrieval [11, 29], and attribute pre-
diction [1, 21] where a common auxiliary task is to chal-
lenge the network to classify additional attributes of the im-
age, such as manner of dress for full-body images of people
or facial attributes (e.g., smiling, narrow eyes, race, gender).
While a range of possible network structures are possible,
common exemplars are having largely independent networks
with a limited number of shared weights (as in [1]), a single
network with minimal separation between tasks (as in [21]),
or a number of parallel single-task classifiers in which the
weights are constrained to be similar to each other. A more
complex approach may be found in [23], in which the sharing
between tasks is learned automatically in an on-line fashion.
Other, more distantly connected domains of machine
learning research reinforce the intuition that learning on dis-
parate tasks can improve model performance. Work in semi-
supervised learning, such as [15] and [19], has shown the
value of additional reconstruction and denoising tasks to
learn representations valuable for a core classification model,
both through regularization and through access to a larger
dataset than is available with label. The widespread suc-
cess of transfer learning is also a testament to the value of
training a single model on nominally distinct tasks. BERT
[7], a recent example from the Natural Language Process-
ing literature, shows strong performance gains from pre-
training a model on masked-word prediction and predictions
of whether two sentences appear in sequence, even when the
true task of interest is quite distinct (e.g. question answering,
translation).
Multi-view learning (see [30] for a survey) is a related ap-
proach in which multiple inputs are trained to a single tar-
get. This approach also arguably leads to the same general
mechanism for improvement: the model is forced to learn
relationships between sets of features that improve the per-
formance using any particular set. While this approach often
requires all sets of features to be available at test time, there
are other approaches, such as [27], that relax this constraint.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of
auxiliary losses for malware classification. We have also
provided experimental evidence which suggests that perfor-
mance gains result from an improved and more informa-
tive representation, not merely a regularization artifact. This
is consistent with our observation that improvements occur
as additional auxiliary losses and different loss types are
added. We also note that different loss types have differ-
ent effects on the ROC; multi-label vendor and semantic at-
tribute tag losses have greatest effect at low false positive
rates (≤ 10−3), while Poisson counts have a substantial net
impact on AUC, the bulk of which stems from detection
boosts at higher FPR.
While we experimented on PE malware in this paper, our
auxiliary loss technique could be applied to many other prob-
lems in the ML-Sec community, including utilizing a label
on format/file type for format-agnostic features (e.g., office
document type in [22]) or file type under a given format, for
example APKs and JARs both share an underlying ZIP for-
mat; a zip-archive malware detector could use tags on the
file type for auxiliary targets. Additionally, tags on topics
and classifications of embedded URLs could serve as auxil-
iary targets when classifying emails or websites.
One open question is whether or not multiple auxiliary
losses improve each others’ performances as well as the main
target. If the multiple outputs of operational interest (such
as the tagging output) can be trained simultaneously while
also increasing (or at least not decreasing) their joint accu-
racy, this could lead to models that are both more compact
and more accurate than individually deployed ones. In addi-
tion to potential accuracy gains, this has significant potential
operational benefits, particularly when it comes to model de-
ployment and updates. We defer a more complete evaluation
of this question to future work.
While this work has focused on applying auxiliary losses
in the context of deep neural networks, there is nothing math-
ematically that precludes using them in conjunction with a
number of other classifier types. Notably, gradient boosted
classifier ensembles, which are also popular in the ML-Sec
community could take very similar auxiliary loss functions
even though the structure of these classifiers is much dif-
ferent. We encourage the ML-Sec research community to
implement multi-objective ensemble classifiers and compare
with our results. Our choice of deep neural networks for
this paper is infrastructural more than anything else; while
several deep learning platforms, including PyTorch, Keras,
and Tensorflow among others easily support multiple ob-
jectives and custom loss functions, popular boosting frame-
works such as lightGBM and XGBoost have yet to imple-
ment this functionality.
The analyses conducted herein used metadata that can nat-
urally be transformed into a label source and impart addi-
tional information to the classifier with no extra data collec-
tion burden on behalf of the threat intelligence feed. More-
over, our auxiliary loss technique does not change the under-
lying feature space representation. Other types of metadata,
e.g., the file path of the malicious binary or URLs extracted
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from within the binary might be more useful in a multi-view
context, serving as input to the classifier, but this approach
raises challenges associated with missing data that our loss
weighting scheme trivially addresses. Perhaps our weight-
ing scheme could even be extended, e.g., by weighting each
sample’s loss contribution according to certainty/uncertainty
in that sample’s label, or re-balancing the per-task loss ac-
cording to the expected frequency of the label in the target
distribution. This could open up novel applications, e.g., de-
tectors customized to a particular user endpoints and remove
sampling biases inherent to multi-task data.
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A Appendix
FPR
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
Poisson 38.05, 61.84 30.19, 30.61 28.68, 48.39 14.29, 85.71 5.56, 97.14
RG Poisson 0.00, -52.63 6.17, 16.33 4.41, 48.39 2.86, 57.14 2.78, 95.71
Vendors 47.12, 55.26 32.47, 51.02 18.38, 35.48 14.29, 42.86 0.00, 80.00
Tags 43.63, 64.47 32.47, 81.63 8.09, 29.03 17.14, 42.86 5.56, 88.57
All Targets 53.75, 81.58 37.01, 65.31 42.65, 87.10 20.00, 57.14 8.33, 94.29
Table A.1: Relative percentage reductions in true positive detection error and standard deviation compared to the baseline
model (displayed as detection error reduction, standard deviation reduction) at different false positive rates (FPRs) for the
different experiments in section 4. Results were evaluated over five different weight initializations and minibatch orderings.
Best detection error reduction consistently occurred when using all auxiliary losses. Best results are shown in bold.
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